ABSTRACT
The European Parliament (EP)'s role in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has always been rather limited. Its prerogatives were somewhat reinforced after the Euro crisis, but its role in policy implementation remained minimal. However, because of the pandemic, the level of integration at the supranational level has significantly increased as a result of, among others, the adoption of unique instruments such as the SURE instrument, Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). This article considers to what extent the EP's role in EMU has been reinforced as a result of these measures. It finds that the EP was regrettably reserved only a limited role in the operationalisation of the RRF and an even lesser role in other instruments, but that legal and political constraints made any other outcome unlikely. This article argues in favour of an increased use of the existing instruments by both the EP and national parliaments, as well as a reinforcement of interparliamentary cooperation. A far more extensive empowerment of the EP would be required if temporary and exceptional developments that occurred in the EMU during the pandemic were to become more entrenched.
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic and the dramatic recession that ensued, have precipitated new and ambitious economic and monetary policy initiatives at the European Union level. This article takes stock of the measures taken thus far and reflects on the impact of the ongoing crisis on the Eurozone’s political economy and its paradigms. It addresses the continued dominance of the European Central Bank;the emergence of a fiscal centre in the Eurozone;and the role of the state in the economy more generally, as well as the place of Europe in the world economy. The article argues that the European response to the economic recession associated with the pandemic is marked both by continuity and path-dependency on the one hand, and potential paradigmatic shifts on the other hand. Copyright © 2020 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.